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1 Introduction
Assume an economy where
• the productive use of land decreases biodiversity,
• the households love for biodiversity everywhere in the economy,
• firms can improve their efficiency and thereby decrease the stress on
biodiversity through R&D, and
• interest groups representing the regions of the union lobby the self-
interested government over environmental policy.
In this setup, following problems are interesting. Should biodiversity man-
agement be kept at the level of regions or delegated to the level of the whole
economy? How much authority should the self-interested government get?
The framework for this study is based on the following experience. In the
European Union (EU), biodiversity is managed by the “government” called
the European Commission (EC). Two directives regulate nature conservation
in the EU (cf. Ostermann 1998):
• Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds (Birds
Directive 1979);
• Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats
and of wild fauna and flora (Habitats Directive 1992).
The Habitats Directive calls for the establishment of a network of designated
sites, called Natura 2000, which will consist of sites designated under the
Habitats Directive (Special Areas of Conservation, SACS) and the Birds Di-
rective (Special Protection Areas, SPAS). These directives contain annexes
with habitats and species listed as being of Community interest, and whose
conservation requires the designation of sites by the Member States. These
habitats must be maintained in a “Favorable Conservation Status”, which
is defined in the Habitats Directive. Member States are responsible for this
on the subsidiarity principle.1 For a Natura 2000 site, there is obligation
1Subsidiarity is an organizing principle that matters ought to be handled by the small-
est, lowest or least centralized competent authority. The central authority should have a
subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at
a more immediate or local level.
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on the Member State to guarantee Favorable Conservation Status with obli-
gations for monitoring and reporting. Although the subsidiarity principle
applies, there is still a possibility of obtaining some financial support for the
management of Natura 2000 sites.
In the highly complex political structure of the EU, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) play a crucial role. Weber and Christophersen (2002)
describe the political influence of the forest owner associations (CEPF and
BNFF) and the environmental NGOs (WWF and Fern) on the implementa-
tion process of the EU habitats directive (HD). They highlight the relation-
ship between the involvement of interest groups in the political process and
the acceptance of legislation among their members. In this paper, I examine
the political equilibrium where the interest groups representing the member
states or their regions lobby the Commission over biodiversity management.
There are several important institutional reasons why EU policy relies
heavily on regulation rather than on other mechanisms to achieve its objec-
tives (Ledoux et al. 2000). Until 1987, EU environmental policy lacked a
proper legal basis in the founding Treaty of Rome. Consequently, all envi-
ronmental policies had to rely on the “implied powers” of Article 235 of the
Treaty, which stipulated the use of Directives and nothing else. With the
ratification of the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, the EU can only adopt eco-taxes
and other fiscal measures with the unanimous agreement of every state (Jor-
dan 1998). The need for unanimity in the EU represents both a huge hurdle
to ecological tax reform and a continuing institutional inducement to rely on
regulation. The EU has been slow to adopt voluntary agreements and other,
“softer” forms of law in spite of the popularity of the subsidiarity principle,
partly because of concerns about their enforceability (Jordan and Jeppesen
2000). The founding Member States gave the EU a powerful institutional
incentive to regulate wherever possible by vesting it with so few financial re-
sources of its own. The Commission soon realized that the only way it could
expand its competence (i.e. its legal power to intervene in particular policy
sectors) was to regulate (Majone 1996). From the Commission’s perspective,
regulation has the added virtue of being paid for by private actors in the
Member States rather than the EU itself.
In this study, I consider biodiversity management in three cases:
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• There is no such international authority as the Commission.
• The current situation in the EU: Direct regulation by the Commission.
• The Commission gets more authority: It can use direct region-specific
subsidies and distribute the costs of these to the member countries.
The comparison of these cases reveals whether the Commission’s present
authority is adequate.
Lobbying can be examined either by the all-pay auction model in which
the lobbyist with the higher effort wins with certainty, or the menu-auction
model in which the lobbyists announce their bids contingent on the politi-
cian’s actions. In the all-pay auction model, lobbying expenditures are in-
curred by all the lobbyists before the politician takes an action. In the menu-
auction model, it is not possible for a lobbyist to spend money and effort on
lobbying without getting what he lobbied for. A good example of the all-pay
auction is Johal and Ulph’s (2002) environmental-policy model where local
interest groups lobby to influence the probability of getting their favorite type
of government elected. I however opt for the menu-auction model, because
that characterizes better the case where the government’s decision variables
lobbied over (e.g. regulatory constraints, subsidies) are continuous and the
interest groups obtain marginal improvements in their position by lobbying.
Palokangas (2008) examines an economy where the government is benev-
olent, the regions cause pollution in fixed proportion to labor in production
and where uncertainty is embodied in technological change in the form of
Poisson processes. As a result of this, Pareto-optimal emission taxes are
obtained for the member regions. Palokangas (2009) modifies this model so
that the central planner is self-interested and subject to lobbying, emission
quotas are the main policy instruments, and labor and emissions are differ-
ent inputs. He shows that with nontraded quotas, the growth rate is socially
optimal, but welfare sub-optimal. Trade in quotas speeds up growth from
the initial position of laissez-faire, but slows down growth from the initial
position of nontraded quotas. In this paper, I extend and modify Palokan-
gas’ (2008, 2009) model so that the government is self-interested, goods are
produced from labor and land, and households love biodiversity which is a
function of land conserved from production in all regions of the economy.
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This paper is organized as follows. Sections 3 and 4 present the general
structure of the economy and a single region. Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 examine
the different cases of biodiversity management.
2 Improvements of the model
3 The economy
I consider an economy of a fixed number J of equal regions that produce the
same (consumption) good.2 The goods market is then balanced, if
C =
J∑
j=1
Yj, (1)
where C is total consumption and Yj output in region j ∈ {1, ..., J}. Region
j possesses a fixed endowment L of labor, of which the amount lj is devoted
to production and the rest zj to R&D, and a fixed endowment of land N , of
which the amount nj is devoted to production and the rest bj to conservation:
L = lj + zj, N = nj + bj. (2)
MacArthur and Wilson (1967) developed a log-linear relationship between
the area of islands I and the number of species S expected to survive: S =
$Iα, where the constant $ > 0 depends on geographic characteristics and
the taxon studied, and the constant α > 0 is the elasticity of the number of
species with respect to the area. Following Rowthorn and Brown (1999), I
normalize $ to unity and assume that in each region j, the area devoted to
conservation, bj, functions like an “island” in the MacArthur-Wilson sense.
The number of species Sj in region j is therefore given by Sj = b
α
j . I use the
average number of species in the economy as a measure biodiversity B:
B
.
=
1
J
J∑
j=1
Sj =
1
J
J∑
j=1
bαj =
1
J
[
bαj + b
α
−j
]
, b−j
.
=
[∑
k 6=j
bαk
]1/α
,
(3)
where b−j is conserved land in the other regions k 6= j.
2With some complication, but with no significant effect on the results, it would be
possible to assume the final good as a CES function of the outputs of all regions.
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Because the households in the whole economy share the same preferences
and are small enough to take the consumption price p, the interest rate r
and biodiversity B as given, the decisions of consumption and production
can be separated. The households behave as if there were a single represen-
tative household in the economy. This chooses its flow of consumption C to
maximize its utility starting at time T ,∫ ∞
T
(log D)e−ρ(θ−T )dθ, D = BδC, δ > 0, ρ > 0, (4)
where θ is time, ρ the constant rate of time preference, D = BδC the compos-
ite commodity of consumption C and biodiversity B, and δ a parameter with
the following characterization: The higher δ, the more the households appre-
ciate biodiversity. One can equivalently assume that the household chooses
the flow of the quantities D of the composite good to maximize utility (4).
This leads to the Euler equation (cf. Grossman and Helpman 1994b)
E˙
E =
dE
dt
1
E = r − ρ with E
.
= pD = pBδC, (5)
where p the consumption price, E household spending and r the interest rate.
Because in the model there is no money that would pin down the nominal
price level at any time, it is convenient to normalize the households’ total
expenditure on the composite commodity in the economy, E , at unity. From
(5) it then follows that the interest rate r is constant:
r = ρ > 0. (6)
4 Technology
On the assumption that the markets for goods, labor and land are perfect,
the firms and households in region j behave as if they were a single revenue-
maximizing agent (hereafter region j) that possesses all resources in that
region. When region j develops a new technology, it increases its total factor
productivity (TFP) by constant a > 1. Its TFP is then equal to aγj , where
γj is its serial number of technology. Given TFP, region j is subject to the
CES production function f(lj, nj), where lj (nj) is the input of labor (land).
It then produces consumption good C according to Yj = a
γjf(lj, nj). I make
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the plausible assumption that labor and land are gross complements, i.e. the
elasticity of substitution between them is less than one. This implies that
njfn(lj, nj)
f(lj, nj)
=
fn(lj/nj, 1)
f(lj/nj, 1)
.
= ξ
( lj
nj
)
, ξ′ > 0,
ljfl(lj, nj)
f(lj, nj)
= 1− ξ
( lj
nj
)
,
fl
.
= ∂f/∂lj, fn
.
= ∂f/∂nj. (7)
Because the markets for goods, labor and land are perfect, the rent for land
is equal to the marginal product aγjfn(lj, nj) and the expenditure share of
land is given by ξ
.
= njfn(lj, nj)/f(lj, nj). Region j produces the composite
commodity D = CBδ of consumption C and biodiversity B according to
yj = B
δYj = B
δaγjf(lj, nj). (8)
The improvement of region j’s technology depends on its labor devoted
to R&D, zj. In a small period of time dt, the probability that R&D leads to
development of a new technology with a jump from γj to γj + 1 is given by
λzjdt, while the probability that R&D remains without success is given by
1− λzjdt, where λ is productivity in R&D. Noting (2), this defines a Poisson
process χj with
dχj =
{
1 with probability λzjdt,
0 with probability 1− λzjdt, zj = L− lj, (9)
where dχj is the increment of the process χj. The expected growth rate of
productivity aγj in the production sector in the stationary state is given by
gj
.
= E
[
log aγ+1 − log aγ] = (log a)λzj = (log a)λ(L− lj),
where E is the expectation operator (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 59, and
Wa¨lde 1999). The expected growth rate gj of the output of the composite
good D is in fixed proportion to zj. This means that labor devoted to R&D
in region j, zj, can be used as a proxy of the growth rate of that region.
Region j pays political contributions Rj to the government. When the
government is self interested, it behaves as if it were a single household
that receives the contributions
∑J
j=1Rj as income. Because the households
in regions j = 1, ..., J and the government consume the same composite
commodity D, real political contributions Rj can be defined in terms of that
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commodity. Real income in region j is therefore given by yj − Rj, where yj
is output and Rj contributions. Noting (8), the expected present value of an
infinite stream of real income in region j beginning at time T is given by
Υj = E
∫ ∞
T
(yj −Rj)e−r(t−T )dt = E
∫ ∞
T
[
Bδaγjf(lj, nj)−Rj
]
e−r(t−T )dt,
(10)
where E is the expectation operator and r > 0 the interest rate [cf. (6)].
5 Laissez-faire
With laissez-faire, there is neither lobbying nor political contributions, Rj =
0 for all j. Region j maximizes the expected present value of an infinite
stream of real income in region j, (10), by the use of labor lj and conserved
land, bj, subject to the definition of biodiversity (3) and Poisson technological
change (9), taking the conserved land in the other regions, b−j, as given. The
value of region j’s optimal program starting at time T is then given by
Ωj(γj, b−j, T )
.
= max
(lj , bj) s.t. (3), (9)
E
∫ ∞
T
Bδaγjf(lj, nj)e
−r(t−T )dt. (11)
I denote Ωj = Ωj(γj, b−j, T ) and Ω˜j = Ωj(γj + 1, b−j, T ). The Bellman
equation corresponding to the optimal program (11) is given by (cf. Dixit
and Pindyck 1994)
rΩj = max
(lj , bj) s.t. (9), (3)
Φj(lj, bj, γj, b−j, T ), (12)
where
Φj(lj, bj, γj, b−j, T ) = Bδaγjf(lj, nj) + λ(L− lj)
(
Ω˜j − Ωj). (13)
Noting (2), (3) and (7), this optimization leads to the first-order conditions
∂Φj
∂bj
= aγj
[
δf(lj, nj)B
δ−1∂B
∂bj
+ fn(lj, nj)B
δ ∂nj
∂bj
]
= aγjfBδ
[
δ
B
∂B
∂bj
+
fn(lj, nj)
f(lj, nj)
∂nj
∂bj
]
= aγjfBδ
[
δ
B
∂B
∂bj
+
ξ(lj/nj)
nj
∂nj
∂bj
]
= aγjBδf
[
δ
BJ
αbα−1j −
1
N − bj ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
= 0, (14)
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∂Φj
∂lj
= Bδaγjfl(lj, nj)− λ
[
Ω˜j − Ωj]
= [1− ξ(lj/nj)]Bδaγjf(lj, nj)/lj − λ
[
Ω˜j − Ωj]
=
[
1− ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
Bδaγj
f(lj, nj)
lj
− λ[Ω˜j − Ωj] = 0. (15)
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Ωj, is in fixed proportion ϕj > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Ωj(γj, b−j) = ϕjBδaγjf(lj, nj). (16)
This implies
(Ω˜j − Ωj)/Ωj = a− 1. (17)
Inserting (16) and (17) into the Bellman equation (12) and (13) yields
1/ϕj = r + (1− a)λ(L− lj) > 0. (18)
Inserting (16), (17) and (18) into the first-order condition (15) yields
lj
Ωj
∂Φj
∂lj
=
1
ϕj
[
1− ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
− (a− 1)λlj
=
[
1− ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
[r + (1− a)λ(L− lj)]− (a− 1)λlj = 0. (19)
Because there is symmetry throughout j = 1, ..., J in the equilibrium
conditions (14) and (19), it is true that lj = l and bj = b in equilibrium.
Inserting these into (3), (14) and (19) yield b−j = b, B = bα and
l =
[
ξ
(
l
N − b
)−1
− 1
]
r + (1− a)λL
(a− 1)λ , ξ
(
l
N − b
)
= α
δ
J
N − b
b
. (20)
Differentiating these equations and noting (2) and (7) yield the following:
Proposition 1 The decentralization of biodiversity management (i.e. a big-
ger number of regions, J) decreases biodiversity B, transfer labor from R&D
into production and slows down economic growth (i.e. decreases z = L− l),
B = bj = b(J), b
′ < 0, lj = l(J), l′ > 0, zj = z(J), z′ < 0. (21)
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With a higher level of decentralization, a smaller proportion of biodiversity
can be controlled within a single region. In that case, the regions have less
incentives for conservation, biodiversity decreases and more labor and land
is devoted to production. This crowds labor out of R&D, there will be less
innovations and the economy will grow at a slower rate.
6 The Pareto optimum
Assume a benevolent government that maximizes the representative house-
hold’s welfare, possesses enough instruments to transfer income between re-
gions and collects no political contributions, Rj = 0 for all j.
3 Because the
government can entirely internalize the externality though biodiversity, the
outcome is the Pareto optimum where the economy behaves as if there were
only one region in the economy, J = 1. Noting (20) and (21), Pareto optimal
inputs (B̂, l̂) are given by
l̂ =
[
ξ
(
l̂
N − b̂
)−1
− 1
]
r + (1− a)λL
(a− 1)λ , ξ
(
l̂
N − b̂
)
= αδ
N − b
b
,
B̂ = b̂
.
= b(1), l̂ = l(1). (22)
In the remainder of this paper, the government is self-interested, not benev-
olent. I consider direct regulation in section 7 and subsidies in section 8.
7 Direct regulation
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), I assume that the government of
the economy has its own interests and collects political contributions. Region
j pays political contributions Rj to the government which decides on the min-
imum requirements bj for conserved land. The order of this common agency
game is the following. First, the regions set their political contributions
(R1, ..., Rn) conditional on the government’s prospective policy (b1, ..., bn).
Second, the government sets the requirements (b1, ..., bJ) and collects the
contributions for its personal consumption. Third, the regions maximize
3In the model, it would be sufficient if the government could tax consumption in all
regions at any rate and then use the revenue for subsidizing R&D.
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the present values of their income given the level of political contributions
(R1, ..., Rn). This game is solved in reversed order: Subsection 7.1 considers
a region, 7.2 the government and 7.3 the political equilibrium.
7.1 The regions
Region j maximizes the present value of its income (10) by labor input lj sub-
ject to Poisson technological change (9), on the assumption that the interest
rate r and the requirements bj for conservation are kept constant. Conse-
quently, the productive use of land, nj = N − bj [cf. (2)], biodiversity B
[cf. (3)] and political contributions Rj are kept constant for region j. It is
equivalent for region j to maximize
E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf(lj, nj)B
δe−r(t−T )dt
by lj subject to (9), given r, bj, B and Rj. The value of region j’s optimal
program starting at time T is then given by
Γj(γj, bj, B, T ) = max
lj s.t. (9)
E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf(lj, nj)B
δe−r(t−T )dt. (23)
I denote Γj = Γj(γj, bj, B, T ) and Γ˜
j = Γj(γj + 1, bj, B, T ). The Bellman
equation corresponding to the optimal program (23) is
rΓj = max
lj
Ψj(lj, γj, bj, B, T ), (24)
where
Ψj(lj, γj, bj, B, T ) = a
γjf(lj, nj)B
δ + λ(L− lj)
[
Γ˜j − Γj]. (25)
Noting (2) and (7), this leads to the first-order condition
∂Ψj
∂lj
= aγjflB
δ − λ[Γ˜j − Γj] = [1− ξ( lj
nj
)]
aγjf(lj, nj)
Bδ
lj
− λ[Γ˜j − Γj]
=
[
1− ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
aγjf(lj, nj)
Bδ
lj
− λ[Γ˜j − Γj] = 0. (26)
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Γj, is in fixed proportion ϑj > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Γj(γj, nj, B, T ) = ϑja
γjf(lj, nj)B
δ. (27)
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This implies
(Γ˜j − Γj)/Γj = a− 1. (28)
Inserting (27) and (28) into the Bellman equation (24) and (25) yields
1/ϑj = r + (1− a)λ(L− lj) > 0. (29)
Inserting (27), (28) and (29) into the first-order condition (26) and noting
(7) and (8), one obtains
lj
Γj
∂Ψj
∂lj
=
1
ϑj
[
1− ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
− (a− 1)λlj
=
[
1− ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)][
r + (1− a)λ(L− lj)
]− (a− 1)λlj = 0. (30)
Noting (2), (3), (7), (23) and (27), region j’s present value (10) becomes
Υj(Rj, b1, ..., bJ) = E
∫ ∞
T
Bδaγjf(lj, nj)e
−r(t−T )dt−
∫ ∞
T
Rje
−r(t−T )dt
= Γj(γj, bj, B, T )−Rj/r,
∂Υj
∂bj
=
∂Γj
∂B
∂B
∂bj
+
∂Γj
∂nj
dnj
dbj
=
∂Γj
∂B
α
J
bα−1j −
∂Γj
∂nj
=
Γj
B
δ
J
αbα−1j −
fn(lj, nj)
f(lj, nj)
Γj
=
Γj
nj
[
δnj
BJ
αbα−1j − ξ
(
lj
nj
)]
,
∂Υj
∂bk
=
∂Γj
∂B
∂B
∂bk
= δ
Γj
B
∂B
∂bk
=
δΓj
BJ
αbα−1k for k 6= j,
∂Υj
∂Rj
= −1
r
. (31)
7.2 The self-interested government
The present value of the expected flow of the real political contributions at
time T is given by
E
∫ ∞
T
b∑
j=1
Rje
−r(θ−T )dθ. (32)
Noting this, (3) and (31), I specify the government’s utility function as:
G(b1, ..., bJ , R1, ..., Rn)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
b∑
j=1
Rje
−r(θ−T )dθ +
b∑
j=1
ζjΥ
j(Rj, b1, ..., bJ)
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=
1
r
b∑
j=1
Rj +
b∑
j=1
ζjΥ
j(Rj, b1, ..., bJ), (33)
where constants ζj ≥ 0 are the weight of region j’s welfare in the government’s
preferences. Grossman and Helpman’s (1994a) objective function (33) is
widely used in models of common agency and it has been justified as follows.
The politicians are mainly interested in their own income which consists of
the contributions from the public,
∑
j Rj, but because they must defend their
position in general elections, they must sometimes take the utilities of the
interest groups Υj into account directly. The linearity of (33) in
∑
j Rj is
assumed, for simplicity.
7.3 The political equilibrium
Each region j tries to affect the government by its contributions Rj. The con-
tribution schedules are therefore functions of the government’s policy vari-
ables (= the amount of conserved land, bj):
Rj(b1, ..., bJ), j = 1, ..., J. (34)
Following Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for this game is a set of contribution schedules Rj(b1, ..., bJ) and
a policy (b1, ..., bJ) such that the following conditions (i)− (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Rj are non-negative but no more than the contributor’s
income, Υj ≥ 0.
(ii) The policy (b1, ..., bJ) maximizes the government’s welfare (33) taking
the contribution schedules Rj as given,
(b1, ..., bJ) ∈ arg max
b1,...,bJ
G
(
b1, ..., bJ , R1(b1, ..., bJ), ..., Rn(b1, ..., bJ)
)
;
(35)
(iii) Region j cannot have a feasible strategy Rj(b1, ..., bJ) that yields it
a higher level of utility than in equilibrium, given the government’s
anticipated decision rule,
(b1, ..., bJ) = arg max
b1,...,bJ
Υj
(
Rj(b1, ..., bJ), b1, ..., bJ
)
. (36)
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(iv) Region j provides the government at least with the level of utility than
in the case it offers nothing (Rj = 0), and the government responds
optimally given the other regions’ contribution functions,
G
(
b1, ..., bJ , R1(b1, ..., bJ), ..., Rn(b1, ..., bJ)
)
≥ max
b1,...,bJ
G
(
b1, ..., bJ , R1(b1, ..., bJ), ..., Rj−1(b1, ..., bJ), 0,
Rj+1(b1, ..., bJ), ..., Rn(b1, ..., bJ)
)
.
Noting (31), the conditions (36) are equivalent to
0 =
∂Υj
∂Rj
∂Rj
∂bk
+
∂Υj
∂bk
= −1
r
∂Rj
∂bk
+
∂Υj
∂bk
for all k,
and
∂Rj
∂bj
= r
∂Υj
∂bj
= r
Γj
N − bj
[
δ
J
N − bj
B
αbα−1j − ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
,
∂Rj
∂bk
= r
∂Υj
∂bk
=
rδΓj
BJ
αbα−1k for k 6= j. (37)
This suggests that in equilibrium the change in the region’s contribution (Rj)
due to a change in the government policy variable bj is equal to the change
in the region’s rent Υj due to this same fact, holding the contribution Rj
constant. Given equations (37), one obtains
∂
∂bk
J∑
j=1
Rj =
J∑
j=1
∂Rj
∂bk
=
∂Rk
∂bk
+
∑
j 6=k
∂Rj
∂bk
=
rΓk
nk
[
δ
J
nk
B
αbα−1k − ξ
]
+
∑
j 6=k
rδΓj
BJ
αbα−1j
=
rΓk
nk
[
δ
J
nk
B
1
Γk
J∑
j=1
Γjαbα−1j − ξ
(
lj
nj
)]
.
(38)
Noting (34) and (36), the government’s utility function (33) becomes
G(b1, ..., bJ) .= G
(
b1, ..., bJ , R1(b1, ..., bJ), ..., Rn(b1, ..., bJ)
)
=
1
r
J∑
j=1
Rj(b1, ..., bJ) +
J∑
j=1
ζj max
b1,...,bJ
Υj
(
Rj(b1, ..., bJ), b1, ..., bJ)
)
. (39)
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Noting (2), (38) and (39), the equilibrium conditions (35) are equivalent to
the first-order conditions
∂G
∂bk
=
1
r
∂
∂bk
J∑
j=1
Rj =
rΓk
nk
[
δ
J
nk
B
1
Γk
J∑
j=1
Γjαbα−1j − ξ
(
lj
nj
)]
=
rΓk
nk
[
δ
J
N − bk
B
1
Γk
J∑
j=1
Γjαbα−1j − ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
= 0 for all k. (40)
The political equilibrium is now specified by the equilibrium conditions
(30) for all regions j = 1, ..., J plus those (40) for the government. In this
system, there are 2n unknowns, (lj, nj) for j = 1, ..., J . I assume, for sim-
plicity, uniform initial productivity in the economy, γk = γ1 for all k 6= 1. In
the system, noting (27), this yields perfect symmetry lj = l, nk = n = N − b
and Γj = Γ for the regions j = 1, ..., J in equilibrium. Given this and (3),
b−j = b and B = b hold true and the equilibrium conditions (30) and (40)
coincide with those with the Pareto optimum, (22):
Proposition 2 With regulation, biodiversity and growth are Pareto optimal.
Because the government as a decision maker eliminates the externality through
biodiversity, the allocation os resources is Pareto optimal. This holds for both
a benevolent and a self-interested government.
In the case of lobbying over direct regulation, the regions pay political
contributions, Rj > 0, while in the case of Pareto-optimal policy, there are
no such contributions, Rj = 0 for all j. Because political contributions are a
waste for the regions j = 1, ..., J , I conclude the following:
Proposition 3 With regulation, welfare for the public (= regions j = 1, ..., J)
is Pareto suboptimal.
8 Conservation subsidies
In this section, the self-interested government sets region-specific subsidies to
conserved land. It can be assumed, without losing any generality, that these
subsidies are set in fixed proportion to the level of productivity in the region,
aγj , so that region j’s productivity-adjusted subsidy to conserved land bj is
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given by aγjsj. The costs for these subsidies are distributed evenly over the
regions, so that a single region pays the lump-sum tax 1
J
∑J
j=1 a
γjsjbj.
Region j pays political contributions Rj to the government. The order
of the common agency game is the following. First, the regions set their po-
litical contributions (R1, ..., Rn) conditional on the government’s prospective
policy (s1, ..., sn). Second, the government sets the subsidies (s1, ..., sn) and
collects the contributions for its personal consumption. Third, the regions
maximize their utilities given the level of political contributions (R1, ..., Rn).
This game is solved in reversed order: Subsection 8.1 considers a region, 8.2
the government and 8.3 the political equilibrium.
8.1 The regions
Because region j pays the tax 1
J
∑J
j=1 a
γjsjbj and receives the productivity-
adjusted subsidy aγjsj per unit of conserved land bj, its present value starting
at time T , (10), changes into
Υj
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
{
aγj
[
f(lj, nj)B
δ + sjbj
]− 1
J
J∑
k=1
aγkskbk −Rj
}
e−r(t−T )dt. (41)
Region j maximizes its present value (41) by labor input in production, lj,
and conserved land bj subject to the definition of biodiversity, (3), Poisson
technological change (9) on the assumption that the interest rate r, the sub-
sidies s1, ..., sJ , conserved land in the other regions, b−j and bk for k 6= j, and
its political contributions Rj are kept constant. It is equivalent to maximize
E
∫ ∞
T
aγj
[
f(lj, nj)B
δ +
(
1− 1
J
)
sjbj
]
e−r(t−T )dt
by (lj, bj) subject to (3) and (9), given r, sj and b−j. The value of the optimal
program for region j can then be defined as follows:
Θj(γj, sj, b−j, T ) =
max
(lj , bj) s.t. (3), (9)
E
∫ ∞
T
aγj
[
f(lj, nj)B
δ +
(
1− 1
J
)
sjbj
]
e−r(t−T )dt. (42)
I denote Θj = Θj(γj, sj, b−j, T ) and Θ˜j = Θj(γj + 1, sj, b−j, T ). The
Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program (42) is
rΘj = max
lj ,bj
Ψj(lj, γj, sj, b−j, T ), (43)
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where
Ψj(lj, γj, sj, b−j, T ) = aγj
[
f(lj, nj)B
δ + (1− 1/J)sjbj
]
+ λ(L− lj)
[
Θ˜j −Θj].
(44)
Noting (2), (3) and (7), this leads to the first-order conditions
∂Ψj
∂bj
= aγj
{[
δf(lj, nj)B
δ−1∂B
∂bj
+Bδfn(lj, nj)
∂nj
∂bj
]
+
(
1− 1
J
)
sj
}
= aγj
{[
δ
J
f(lj, nj)B
δ−1αbα−1j −Bδfn(lj, nj)
]
+
(
1− 1
J
)
sj
}
= aγj
{
f(lj, nj)B
δ
[
δ
JB
αbα−1j −
ξ(lj/nj)
nj
]
+
(
1− 1
J
)
sj
}
= aγj
{
f(lj, nj)B
δ
[
δα
JB
bα−1j −
1
N − bj ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
+
(
1− 1
J
)
sj
}
= 0,
(45)
∂Ψj
∂lj
= aγjfl(lj, nj)B
δ − λ[Θ˜j −Θj]
= [1− ξ(lj/nj)]aγjf(lj, nj)Bδ/lj − λ
[
Θ˜j −Θj]
=
[
1− ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
aγjf(lj, nj)
Bδ
lj
− λ[Θ˜j −Θj] = 0. (46)
Solving for the subsidy sj from the condition (45) yields
sj =
(
1− 1
J
)−1
f(lj, nj)B
δ
[
1
N − bj ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)
− δ
JB
αbα−1j
]
.
(47)
I try the solution that the value of the program, Θj, is given by
Θj(γj, sj, b−j, T ) = ϑjaγj = ϑjaγj
[
f(lj, nj)B
δ + (1− 1/J)sjbj
]
,
∂Θj
∂sj
=
(
1− 1
J
)
ϑja
γjbj,
∂Θj
∂b−j
= δϑja
γjfBδ−1
∂B
∂b−j
=
δ
J
ϑja
γjf(lj, nj)B
δ−1αbα−1−j , (48)
where ϑj > 0 is independent of the control variables. This implies
(Θ˜j −Θj)/Θj = a− 1. (49)
Inserting (48) and (49) into the Bellman equation (43) and (44) yields
1/ϑj = r + (1− a)λ(L− lj) > 0. (50)
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Given (48), (49) and (50) the first-order condition (46) changes into
lj
Θj
∂Ψj
∂lj
= [r + (1− a)λ(L− lj)]
[
1− ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
− (a− 1)λlj = 0. (51)
Noting that lj ∈ [0, N ] by (2), I obtain
lim
λ→0
lj
Θj
∂Ψj
∂lj
= r
[
1− ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)]
> 0 and lim
λ→0
lj = N.
Noting this and differentiating (51) totally yield
lj = `(bj), `
′ < 0, lim
λ→0
`′ = 0. (52)
The results (52) can be interpreted as follows: Because labor and land are
gross complements, a transfer of land from production to conservation (i.e.
an increase in bj) decreases labor lj devoted to production, `
′ < 0. When the
productivity of R&D, λ, is small enough [i.e. λ → 0, cf. (9)], region j has
no incentives to devote labor to R&D, zj = 0 and lj = L [cf. (2)]. In that
case, a transfer of land from production to conservation (i.e. an increase in
bj) has no effect on labor devoted to production, lj = L.
Given (7), (41), (47) and (52), region j’s present value (41) changes into
Υj(Rj, b1, ..., bJ)
= E
∫ ∞
T
{
aγj
[
f(lj, nj)B
δ +
(
1− 1
J
)
sjbj
]
− 1
J
∑
k 6=j
aγkskbk
}
e−r(t−T )dt− Rj
r
= E
∫ ∞
T
f(lj, nj)B
δ
{
aγj + aγj
[
1
N − bj ξ
(
lj
N − bj
)
− δ
JB
αbα−1j
]
bj
− 1
J − 1
∑
k 6=j
aγk
f(lk, nk)
f(lj, nj)
[
1
N − bk ξ
(
lk
N − bk
)
− δ
JB
αbα−1k
]
bk
}
e−r(t−T )dt
−Rj/r
= E
∫ ∞
T
f
(
`(bj), N − bj
)( 1
J
J∑
κ=1
bκ
)δ
×{
aγj + aγj
[
1
N − bj ξ
(
`(bj)
N − bj
)
− δ
JB
αbα−1j
]
bj
− 1
J − 1
∑
k 6=j
aγk
f
(
`(bk), N − bk
)
f
(
`(bj), N − bj
) [ 1
N − bk ξ
(
`(bk)
N − bk
)
− δ
JB
αbα−1k
]
bk
}
× e−r(t−T )dt−Rj/r. (53)
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From (2), (3) and (7) it follows that in the stationary state where the inputs
of labor and land (lj, nj, bj and B =
∑
j bj for all j) are kept constant, the
sum of the functions (53) has the following properties:
J∑
j=1
Υj(Rj, b1, ..., bJ) = E
∫ ∞
T
J∑
j=1
aγjf(lj, nj)B
δe−r(t−T )dt− 1
r
J∑
j=1
Rj
= BδE
∫ ∞
T
J∑
j=1
aγjf(lj, nj)e
−r(t−T )dt− 1
r
J∑
j=1
Rj,
∂
∂bk
J∑
j=1
Υj = BδE
∫ ∞
T
J∑
j=1
aγjf(lj, nj)e
−r(t−T )dt
×
[
δ
B
∂B
∂bk
+
E
∫∞
T
aγk
[
fl(lk, nk)dlj/dbk + fn(lk, nk)dnk/sbk
]
e−r(t−T )dt
E
∫∞
T
∑J
j=1 a
γjf(lj, nj)e−r(t−T )dt
]
= BδE
∫ ∞
T
J∑
j=1
aγjf(lj, nj)e
−r(t−T )dt
×
[
δ
BJ
αbα−1j +
[
fl(lk, nk)`
′(bk)− fn(lk, nk)
]
E
∫∞
T
aγke−r(t−T )dt
E
∫∞
T
∑J
j=1 a
γjf(lj, nj)e−r(t−T )dt
]
= BδE
∫ ∞
T
J∑
j=1
aγjf(lj, nj)e
−r(t−T )dt×
{
δα
BJ
bα−1j
+
[
fl(lk, nk)
f(lk, nk)
`′(bk)− fn(lk, nk)
f(lk, nk)
]
E
∫∞
T
aγke−r(t−T )dt
E
∫∞
T
∑J
j=1 a
γj f(lj ,nj)
f(lk,nk)
e−r(t−T )dt
}
= BδE
∫ ∞
T
J∑
j=1
aγjf(lj, nj)e
−r(t−T )dt ×
{
δα
BJ
bαj+[
1− ξ(lk/nk)
lk
`′(bk)− ξ(lk/nk)
nk
]
E
∫∞
T
aγke−r(t−T )dt
E
∫∞
T
∑J
j=1 a
γj f(lj ,nj)
f(lk,nk)
e−r(t−T )dt
}
.
(54)
8.2 The self-interested government
Because there is a one-to-one correspondence from the region-specific sub-
sidies (s1, ..., sJ) to the quatities of conserved land, (b1, ..., bJ), through the
regions’ equilibrium conditions (47) and (52), the political equilibrium can
be constructed in terms of (b1, ..., bJ). Thus, I assume that the regions
j = 1, ..., J lobby the government over (b1, ..., bJ). Formally, the govern-
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ment’s utility function is the same (33) as in subsection 7.2, but the regions’
response functions Υj(Rj, b1, ..., bJ) have different properties [cf. (54)].
8.3 The political equilibrium
The government maximizes its utility function (33) by (b1, ..., bJ), given the
contribution schedules Rj(b1, ..., bJ). A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
this game is a set of contribution schedules Rj(b1, ..., bJ) and policy (b1, ..., bJ)
such that the conditions (i) − (iv) in subsection 7.3 hold. Noting (53), the
conditions (36) are equivalent to
0 =
∂Υj
∂Rj
∂Rj
∂bk
+
∂Υj
∂bk
= −1
r
∂Rj
∂bk
+
∂Υj
∂bk
for all j and k,
and
∂Rj
∂bk
= r
∂Υj
∂bk
for all k. (55)
Noting (36), the government’s utility function (33) becomes
G(b1, ..., bJ , J) .= G
(
b1, ..., bJ , R1(b1, ..., bJ), ..., RJ(b1, ..., bJ)
)
=
1
r
J∑
j=1
Rj(b1, ..., bJ) +
J∑
j=1
ζj max
b1,...,bJ
Υj
(
Rj(b1, ..., bJ), b1, ..., bJ
)
. (56)
Noting (53), (54), (55) and (56), the conditions (35) are equivalent to
∂G
∂bk
=
1
r
∂
∂bk
J∑
j=1
Rj = B
δE
∫ ∞
T
J∑
j=1
aγjf(lj, nj)e
−r(t−T )dt ×
{
δα
BJ
bα−1k
+
[
1− ξ(lk/nk)
lk
`′(bk)− ξ(lk/nk)
nk
]
E
∫∞
T
aγke−r(t−T )dt
E
∫∞
T
∑J
j=1 a
γj f(lj ,nj)
f(lk,nk)
e−r(t−T )dt
}
= 0. (57)
In the system (51) and (57), there are 3J equations and 3J unknown
variables, lj, bj and sj for j = 1, ..., J . Because in that system there is
symmetry throughout j = 1, ..., J , noting (2) and (3), it is true in equilibrium
that lj = l, bj = b−j = b, nj = n = N − b, zj = z = L− l, B = b, sj = s and
E
∫∞
T
aγke−r(t−T )dt
E
∫∞
T
∑J
j=1 a
γje−r(t−T )dt
=
1
J
. (58)
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Given (52) and (58), the conditions (51) and (57) change into
l =
[
ξ
(
l
N − b
)−1
− 1
]
r + (1− a)λL
(a− 1)λ , (59)
ξ
(
l
N − b
)
= ξ
(
l
n
)
= n
{
δ
bJ
/
E
∫∞
T
aγke−r(t−T )dt
E
∫∞
T
∑J
j=1 a
γje−r(t−T )dt
+ (1− ξ)`
′(b)
l
}
= n
[
α
δ
b
+ (1− ξ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
`′(b)
l︸︷︷︸
−
]
< α
nδ
b
= αδ
N − b
b
, (60)
lim
λ→0
ξ
(
l
N − b
)
= n lim
λ→0
[
α
δ
b
+ (1− ξ) `
′(b)
l︸︷︷︸
→0
]
= αδ lim
λ→0
N − b
b
. (61)
First, consider the case where the productivity of R&D is small enough
to eliminate R&D and technological change (i.e. λ → 0). In that case,
equations (59) and (61) change into the corresponding ones at the Pareto
optimum, (22). Together with Proposition 2, this result can be rephrased as
follows:
Proposition 4 Without technological change (i.e. λ→ 0), biodiversity and
the growth rate are Pareto optimal both with direct regulation and with the
use of conservation subsidies.
With technological change λ > 0, the comparison of the Pareto optimum,
(22), to the case of conservation subsidies, (59) and (60), proves the following.
The function ξ
(
l
N−b
)
, is equal to (N − b)αδ/b in the cases of the Pareto
optimum and direct regulation, but lower than (N − b)αδ/b in the case of
conservation subsidies. Thus, a shift from direct regulation to the use of
conservation subsidies decreases the expenditure share of land, ξ
(
l
N−b
)
, but
increases that of labor, 1− ξ, in production [cf. (7)]. With a smaller ξ( l
N−b
)
,
labor devoted to production, l, rises [cf. (59)], and labor devoted to R&D,
z = N − l [cf. (2)], falls. Because labor and land are gross complements
[cf. ξ′ > 0 in (7)], with a smaller ξ
(
l
N−b
)
and a bigger l, the labor-land ratio
l/n = l/(N − b), the amount of conserved land, b, and biodiversity B = bα
[cf. (3)] decrease. These results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 5 With technological change λ > 0, a shift from direct regula-
tion to the use of conservation subsidies narrows biodiversity (i.e. B falls)
and slows down economic growth (i.e. z falls).
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Propositions 4 and 5 can be explained as follows: In the case of direct
regulation, the government determines the use of land at the level of the
whole economy and the externality through biodiversity is fully internalized.
Now, assume that the government switches from direct regulation to the use
of subsidies. The outcome of this shift hinges critically on the existence of
technological change as follows:
• With no technological change, a transfer of land from production to
conservation (i.e. an increase in b) has no effect on labor devoted to
production, `′ ≡ 0. In that case, the use of subsidies is equivalent to
direct regulation as an instrument of biodiversity management.
• With technological change, a transfer of land from production to con-
servation (i.e. an increase in b) decreases labor devoted to production,
`′ < 0. Through that route, a switch from direct regulation to the
use of subsidies decreases labor devoted to production and increases
the marginal product of land in production. With a higher marginal
product of land in production, some conserved land is transferred to
production and biodiversity diminishes. A greater amount of land in
production increases the marginal product of labor in production. With
a higher marginal product of labor in production, labor is transferred
from R&D to production. With smaller R&D, the growth rate falls.
9 Conclusions
With a higher level of centralization, the welfare effect through biodiversity
can be internalized more easily. In that case, regions have more incentives
to transfer land from production into conservation. This decreases output,
transfers labor from production to R&D, land from production to conserva-
tion and improves biodiversity. Increased R&D speeds up economic growth.
The introduction of an economy-wide government, benevolent or self-
interested, as a decision maker for the use of land eliminates the externality
through biodiversity. For this reason, direct regulation leads to the same
biodiversity and the same growth rate as at the Pareto optimum. Because the
public pays political contributions to the government in the case of regulation,
their welfare is lower in the case of regulation than at the Pareto optimum.
21
If there were no technological change, a transfer of land from production
to conservation would not have any effect on labor devoted to production.
In that case, the use of subsidies would be equivalent to direct regulation as
an instrument of biodiversity management.
In the presence of technological change, a transfer of land from production
to conservation decreases labor devoted to production. Through that route, a
switch from direct regulation to the use of subsidies decreases labor devoted
to production and increases the marginal product of land in production.
With a higher marginal product of land in production, some conserved land
is transferred to production and biodiversity diminishes. A greater amount
of land in production increases the marginal product of labor in production.
With a higher marginal product of labor in production, labor is transferred
from R&D to production. With smaller R&D, the growth rate falls.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
game-theoretic model is used to derive results on growth and biodiversity,
nevertheless the following conclusion seems to be justified. The prospect of
lobbying changes the outcome of biodiversity management fundamentally. A
larger package of government policy instruments leads to Pareto improvement
with a benevolent, but to Pareto worsening with a self-interested government.
In the case of Natura 2000, for instance, direct regulation without any budget
can be a proper amount of authority for the Commission. Larger authority
narrows biodiversity and slows down economic growth.
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